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ABSTRACT 
Governance indicators have come under fire in recent years, especially the World 
Governance Indicators (WGIs). Critics present these indicators as a-theoretical and 
biased. Critics of the critics counter that no better alternatives exist. We suggest 
otherwise, arguing that more appropriate ‘governance’ indicators will (i) have 
theoretical grounding, (ii) focus on specific fields of engagement, (iii) emphasize 
outcomes, and (iv) control for key contextual differences in comparing countries. 
Such measures can help indicate where countries seem to have governance problems, 
allowing second stage analyses of what these problems are. We present under 
national five mortality rates adjusted for country income groups as an example of 
such measure, presenting data for contextually controlled outcomes in this specific 
field to show where governance seems better and worse.  The United States is shown 
up as relatively weak, whereas a country like Pakistan seems to have better 
governance in this sector than other low income countries. The indicator allows 
questions about why governance of this sector might be problematic in certain 
contexts and easier in others.  
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  1INTRODUCTION 
We measure public sector governance because we believe that governance matters. 
But critics contend that the most common measures of governance are a-theoretical 
and biased and capture little more than a country’s state of development. Measures 
like the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) aggregate information about outcomes, 
processes, and policy choices across various fields and areas of interest, which 
ultimately has them reflecting a sweeping perspective on a country’s political, 
economic and administrative picture. This may be a useful measure if one is 
interested in governance as the general exercise of authority. But like any measure of 
general health this is limited as a diagnostic indicator and ultimately duplicates what 
one finds in comparative developmental data: more well-off people (nations) have 
better general health (governance) than others. Indicators should be reliable pointers 
and signals of specific things, and general measures arguably do not do this. 
If we want to generate public sector governance indicators that do act as pointers and 
assist in guiding diagnostic activities, a few adjustments must be made, led by 
theoretical considerations about why authority is exercised in the public domain at all 
(and on whose behalf). Such questions lead us to focus the governance concept on 
specific fields of engagement instead of across society broadly. This entails looking at 
governance exercised across particular sets of organizations that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognized area of institutional life, demarcated in geographical or 
functional areas like child health care or education. Assessing governance across 
multiple fields at once is theoretically and practically problematic, as authority is 
seldom exercised in the same manner across fields, even in the same country. We 
center attention on the children’s health field in this article, and ask develop an 
indicator that arguably points out how well such field is governed in different 
countries, allowing second-stage questions about why and what could be done to 
improve in those settings of weaker governance.   
The children’s health field looks different across countries, with different players in 
different settings. In some cases it is dominated by donor-led sanitation programs and 
in others it centers on private provision of early childhood vaccines, for example. We 
measure governance simply by looking at the results of the interactions of these 
different sets of players; or how authority is exercised to ensure these interactions get 
things done. The focus on outcomes—well-being measures like under-five survival 
rates—means we do not focus on processes or policy choices often dominant in 
governance indicators and which some may normatively prefer as a means to 
producing outcomes. Procedures and policies differ across countries with similar 
outcomes, because of different contexts that accommodate and may require different 
ways of exercising authority. Outcome indicators help to identify which countries 
have governance structures appropriate and inappropriate for their contexts, which 
will then allow a second-stage discussion of which procedural and policy approaches 
and paths fit best in different circumstances. The approach puts function ahead of 
form in assessing how effectively countries exercise authority in specific arenas. 
Some aspects of context matter in a systematic way and need to be controlled when 
constructing governance indicators, however. Countries fall into different categories 
  2just as people are in different age groups, for example, where one expects predictable 
differences in general health and in the prevalence of particular health ailments. 
Variations in country-level survival rates are largely explained by differences in per 
capita income, for example, which suggests that the under-five survival rate of a low 
income country will dependably differ from a middle income country which will 
dependably differ from a higher income country. The dependable differences are 
noise when one is trying to reflect how poorly or well authority is exercised in the 
countries (as in governance). Low income countries should be compared with low 
income countries and high income countries with high income countries as a result, 
where governance indicators show how countries compare at their income level. We 
propose that this is like looking at whether a boxer boxes below, at, or above his 
weight level. The answer to such question points to whether that boxer (country’s 
child health sector) manages himself and his talents well (is well governed). 
WHERE WE STAND IN MEASURING GOVERNANCE 
The good governance community blossomed in the past decade, as academics and 
practitioners have warmed to the idea that governance matters to social, political 
and economic development. At its most basic, ‘governance’ is seen to refer to 
“the general exercise of authority” (Michalski, Miller and Stevens 2001, 9) or, as 
the World Governance Indicator (WGI) developers put it, “[T]he traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton 1999, 1). Built ostensibly on this general definition, the WGIs 
have emerged as arguably the most influential governance measure (Arndt and 
Oman 2006). They combine various stand-alone elements into aggregate 
indicators of six governance concepts, including ‘rule of law’ and ‘government 
effectiveness’. These mix outcomes (like effective health care statistics) with 
processes and structure (like meritocratic hiring and the degree of 
decentralization) and policy choices (about the size of government, for example, 
and the extent to which a government exhibits a pro-business orientation). The 
various elements are aggregated into indicators that apparently reflect how well 
authority is exercised, by concept area, in a country (a.k.a. governance). Figure 1 
shows scores for 181 countries on the ‘government effectiveness’ element. Scores 
to the left on the horizontal axis reflect poorer governance (below zero).  
Indicators like this are used to benchmark countries against each other, identify better 
from worse governed countries, and guide the latter group of countries in identifying 
options for reform. Critics contend that governance indicators like the WGI’s are less 
than useful in facilitating these tasks, however, especially in guiding countries to 
paths for governance improvement (Andrews 2008, Kurtz and Schrank 2007, Thomas 
2006). Some ask what the indicators actually measure, given that they aggregate so 
many elements into dimension scores (and that elements differ for different 
countries). Countries can record similar scores on the basis of different types of data 
input as a result, which complicates indicator interpretation and use. One country may 
have a well governed education system but a poorly governed health system, for 
example, but both may get similar scores on the ‘government effectiveness’ measure. 
Given this, we do not know why Singapore has a higher score than the USA in Figure 
  31, or Kiribati better than the Marshall Islands or Sierra Leone. Or why Sierra Leone 
and Angola score similarly. 
Fig. 1. WGI Government effectiveness scores for 181 countries, 2007 
 
Even where countries score commonly in the same sector, it is often with very 
different types of procedural inputs and processes distributing and regulating 
authority. Strong health sectors emerge in different-looking systems in OECD 
countries, for example, with some ascribing greater authority to the private sector 
(USA) than others (Sweden) (Andrews 2008). This is confusing given that the 
indicators imply that some processes are ‘better’ than others (and these ‘better’ 
processes are often the source of reform advice emerging from a good governance 
benchmarking exercise). Smaller government size is positively presented in the 
governance indicators, for example, as is a professionalized civil service, as is 
disciplined fiscal management and flexibility for private sector activity. Are all of 
these forms of engagement equally effective and ‘good’ across different functional 
fields and countries? Are these ‘better’ practices really better? Do countries that look 
better even have the same practices in place? Input data is also often captured in 
perception-based surveys as well, which fuels claims of bias in the data and also leads 
to questions about validity and reliability. Are the data really just reflecting charged 
opinions of narrow respondent sets?  
A colleague, reflecting on these kinds of issues, suggests that the indicators are at best 
like measures of ‘general health’ individuals get from their doctors. His perspective 
echoes those who believe the indicators act as proxies of a country’s state of 
development. This is shown graphically in Figure 1, where the movement from left to 
right (lower to higher government effectiveness scores) reflects a move from the 
lower income countries to lower middle income, upper middle income, and high 
income countries. What the figure shows graphically is also evident in statistics, with 
a strong correlation existing between WGI dimension scores like ‘effective 
government’ and per capita income figures (0.76 in the 181 countries shown in Figure 
1, significant at 0.00). If a country is more developed, it also seems to have better 
governance. The problems with these kinds of indicators are numerous, and reflect 
problems with general health indicators: They are biased towards certain groups (just 
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  4as young adults are mostly in better general health than older adults, for example, 
even if older adults are in good general health relative to their age); they can mask 
specific problems (that require more specific diagnostic approaches); they are seldom 
useful in helping find appropriate treatments to ailments (saying someone is in bad 
general health does not bring one closer to advising them on where the problem lies 
or what to do about it). 
When confronted with these kinds of critiques, some defend the current governance 
indicators, suggesting that they may be the best way to measure ‘governance’ 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007). We agree that some defense is appropriate, 
and indicators like the WGIs have helped put governance onto the development 
agenda. We also contend, however, that there are better approaches to developing 
indicators, where the indicators really do allow benchmarking, the identification of 
better and worse governed countries (given contextual differences which structure 
expectations of ‘better’ and ‘worse’), and a starting point for exploring ways of 
getting better. The approach to identifying such indicators must begin with a 
theoretical understanding of what we are talking about, something we believe current 
governance indicators lack.  
THEORIZING ABOUT GOVERNANCE 
We believe that theoretical frameworks are important constructs for thinking about 
why a certain phenomenon matters (Andrews 2008). This understanding helps us to 
measure the phenomenon. Governance indicators have been developed with little 
theoretical framework, which is one reason why they are vague and imprecise 
(Thomas 2006; Kurtz and Schrank 2007). If we stick with the general idea that 
governance is about exercising authority, we wonder who the authority is exercised 
by, on behalf of, and for what reason? Answers to such questions will help guide us to 
appropriate measures of the phenomenon.   
Interestingly, the literature on publicly traded companies defines corporate 
governance in a manner that embodies answers to such questions, and helps one 
locate the phenomenon in a theory of the firm. Using Tirole’s (2001,4) definition, one 
sees corporate governance as “the design of institutions that induce or force 
management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders.” Consider the basic elements 
of governance implied in this definition: (1) It is focused on how mechanisms 
(institutions) regulate (2) the way that authority is exercised by one set of agents 
(managers) (3) who act on behalf of a broad group of principals (stakeholders) (4) 
with the goal of maximizing the welfare of these principals (stakeholders). 
Combining these elements, we see that good governance emerges when specific 
agents exercise delegated authority in such a way that their specific principals enjoy 
improved welfare.   
This definition has parallels in the political science and public management 
literatures. Kooiman’s (2003, 4) characterization of governing, for example, points to 
“the totality of interactions, in which public and private actors participate, aimed at 
solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities.” Hill and Lynn (2004, 4) 
describe public sector governance from a management perspective, as “Regimes of 
laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, 
  5and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services through 
associations with agents in public and private sectors.” 
The idea of delegated authority emerges across these definitions, as does the focus on 
outcomes as the purpose of delegated authority (maximizing stakeholder welfare, 
“solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities” and ensuring the 
“provision of publicly supported goods and services”). In the public sector context we 
are obviously dealing with governments as the agents to whom authority is delegated, 
by citizens (as principals), with the explicit goal of maximizing various kinds of 
social welfare (as the outcome). Governments can use this delegated authority in 
many ways: to garner and allocate resources, build capacities (human and physical), 
regulate via laws or force, and such. We argue that governance is superior when 
authority is exercised in such a manner that social welfare is maximized and 
governance is inferior when authority is exercised in a manner that does not 
maximize welfare. 
Note that, in this definition, governance is not assessed on the basis of processes of 
mechanisms in place or even on the specifics of how authority is exercised. While we 
agree that governance is influenced by what Tirole (2001,4) calls “institutions that 
induce or force management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders,” we do not 
think that particular sets of institutional forms necessarily indicate or reflect good 
governance better than others in all settings. Similarly, we agree with Hill and Lynn 
(2004, 4) that governance systems comprise “Regimes of laws, rules, judicial 
decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable” service 
provision, but we do not believe that the presence (or absence) of particular types of 
processes and mechanisms necessarily indicates whether governance is good or bad. 
We hold that governance institutions, processes, ‘regimes’ and such that ascribe and 
distribute and shape authority can vary across countries and sectors for legitimate, 
contextual reasons, most notably the different roles of government in countries. 
United States citizens have given different authority to local and federal government 
in the education and health sectors, for example. And United States citizens give their 
government different authority to that delegated by Swedish citizens or Ghanaian 
citizens to their governments, for example, implying different roles, interactions and 
mechanisms for governing.
5  
Some roles, interactions and mechanisms might be more effective than others in 
facilitating better governance outcomes, but these can only be identified after we look 
at specific organizational fields (education or health care, for example), measure the 
outcomes of interactions in these fields, and consider contextual differences between 
countries. Function must lead form. 
FOCUSING ON ORGANIZATIONAL FIELDS  
In considering this theoretical approach we believe that governance can only, by 
definition, be assessed in the context of specific fields, defined in organizational 
theory as the particular set of organizations that, “in the aggregate, constitute a 
                                                 
5 We are obviously simplifying the idea of citizens authorizing states to act, which is not this simple. 
  6recognized area of institutional life” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 148).
6 The field 
includes “suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations” involved in getting things done in a particular functional area 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 148). Such system is an appropriate unit of analysis for 
governance research because it involves multiple players, particularly principals and 
agents, who are constantly engaged in allocating, receiving and managing authority to 
do specific things, with particular functional results expected. The quality of 
governance is reflected in how well the entire field engages to produce these results.  
One should note some important features of organizational fields (Scott 1987, 122-
125). They come in different sizes and with different relational structures (often 
driven by resource access, which can yield fields placid, disturbed or turbulent, 
randomized, reactive or clustered (Emery and Trist 1965)) and different authority 
typologies (including social-choice, coalitional, federative and unitary (Warren 
1967)). They are sometimes geographically centered and sometimes dispersed. These 
differences are reflected in different relational and normative governance structures 
which emerge organically to reflect context and simultaneously “have strong effects 
on their constituent organizations” (Scott 1987, 123).   
Governments play different roles in different fields, largely because the sets of 
players and institutional logics differ in different fields, rates of change in fields 
varies, and demands on controlling and shaping behavior are not always the same (Di 
Maggio and Powell 1991; Reay and Hinings 2005). The education and health care 
fields look very different in the United States, for example. The roles of Federal, State 
and Local governments differ between these two fields, as does the relative size and 
scope of engagement by private and non-profit players. These differences matter 
because public sector governance is about the exercise of authority by government 
agents, on behalf of citizen principals, to maximize the welfare of those principals; 
and all of these elements are field-specific. In some fields citizens delegate authority 
to government to regulate, in other fields to provide services directly.   
As a result of the expected variation in structures between fields within and across 
countries, and the implications of such for governmental roles, we believe that 
governance indicators should be defined by the field in which outcomes are produced, 
players can be identified, and authority structures delineated. This allows governance 
indicators to look like specific rather than general health measures. Prominent 
governance indicators pay indirect homage to this, including the WGI, which 
separates ‘government effectiveness’ from ‘rule of law’ in its components. But these 
are categories of interest and not defined areas in which authority is exercised—the 
key driver of the governance definition. As a result, the measures become difficult to 
interpret. Practitioners, policymakers and researchers would be better served with 
indicators focused on specific outcomes in specific fields that make immediate sense 
and can be acted upon. We see the child health arena as one field, with identifiable 
outcomes and navigable organizational fields—where one can identify key agents, 
organizations, organizing logics and systems connecting and structuring such (even 
                                                 
6 Fields are similarly referred to as arenas or subsystems (Parto 2005) seen as “the social space where 
individuals interact, exchange good and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight” 
(Ostrom 1999, 42). 
  7though these do vary across countries and over time, shown in studies on changes to 
health care fields more broadly, in Currie and Guah (2007) and Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996)). Child health is the complex product of multiple players bringing 
multiple inputs to bear in these fields, under specific authority structures, with 
different effects in different settings
7 (other field-based studies include Beaumont 
(2003) on antipoverty systems and Parto (2005) on waste subsystems in the 
Netherlands and the UK and Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) on regulation of the 
internet). 
EMPHASIZING OUTCOMES 
We assume that principals delegate authority to agents in order to achieve outcomes. 
Mirroring basic theories of public finance, we hold that citizens delegate authority to 
the public sector when faced with restrictive costs or complicated problems of 
cooperation and coordination. Citizens are still looking for outcomes in return for the 
delegated authority, however, and the quality of public sector governance is reflected 
in whether public organizations exercise authority in a way that facilitates outcome 
and value production. This is true in the area of macroeconomic management, 
policing and defense, education, health care, and a myriad of others. 
Cross-country public sector governance indicators should focus on domains where 
most would agree that citizens accord governments authority to influence outcomes 
(Andrews 2008, Goldsmith 2007). This could include ‘public goods’ interpreted 
narrowly (like defense) and more broadly (in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), for example). Outcome measures should be constructed to reflect 
effectiveness (what level of service is produced, for example) as well as equity (how 
many citizens have access to the service) and cost (how much do citizens have to 
pay). The last consideration is particularly important because efficient production of 
one good allows citizens resources to consume other goods (further improving 
welfare).  Inefficiencies in one organizational field will impact effectiveness in 
others. 
We present under-five mortality rates (u5mr) as an interesting example of a 
governance outcome variable. The Millennium Development Goals embed targets for 
this outcome, indicating both its importance to social welfare in development and the 
general perspective that it is influenced by publicly-exercised authority (given that 
MDG commitments involve governments) (Lawn et al. 2007). Buckley (2003) notes 
that the infant mortality rate is “regarded as one of the most revealing measures of 
how well a society is meeting the needs of its people.” Performance on the indicator 
is also understood to reflect both the level of service provision and equity of such 
provision, with more equal countries tending to have better u5mr statistics (all else 
equal) than others (Filmer and Pritchett 1999). Governance is cited as an influence on 
this rate as well (Baldacci et al. 2008; Lewis and Musgrove 2008). From a theoretical 
perspective, we see governance reflected in this indicator via the following rationale:  
                                                 
7 Various authors have chronicled the complex lists of players and influences in the child health field, 
including Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) who show that government health entities matter; Filmer and 
Pritchett (1999) find that players in the education and religious realms matter as well; Wang (2003) 
argues that producers of electricity influence infant mortality rates in urban areas; Fay, Leipziger, 
Wodon and Yepes (2005) note that providers of basic infrastructure influence mortality rates as well.  
  8Citizens grant public organizations the authority to ensure optimal 
provision of child health care, in whichever way appropriate, reflected in 
the cost efficient production of the highest possible survival rate of all 
children under five. Governance systems are ‘good’ when they ensure 
relatively high survival rates at relatively low average cost. 
Figure 2 shows this for 181 countries in 2005. The horizontal axis shows the survival 
rate for children under-five years of age in these countries (calculated simply as 1-
u5mr/1000).
8 Higher scores indicate more welfare for citizens. The vertical axis 
shows a proxy for the average cost of producing these services, drawn from the 
proportion of per capita GDP spent on health.
910 Lower relative costs indicate more 
welfare for citizens. Countries in the bottom right quadrant, like Indonesia, Cyprus 
and Singapore, have higher survival rates than the global average (94.7%) and lower 
costs than the global average (6.7% of GDP per capita). This is a zone of relatively 
good governance in the child health sector, where authority is exercised across 
service delivery processes and relationships in a manner that results in strong 
outcomes at relatively low cost. Countries in the top left quadrant, like Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda, Timor Leste, Zimbabwe and South Africa, are producing lower than average 
child survival rates at higher than average costs. This is a zone of relatively inferior 
governance, reflected in a failure to exercise authority in a manner that ensures 
contextually appropriate levels of child survival. 
Fig. 2. Examining governance through u5mr data for 181 countries 
                                                 
8 In the case of the United States, for example, the u5mr in 2005 was 7.9 per 1,000. This means that the 
survival rate for children under 5 is 1-7.9/1000 = 99.21%. 
9 The measure shows the percentage of per capita GDP required to ensure full survival of children 
under-five, given 2005 spending on health care. It is calculated by assessing the relative cost of 
producing one percentage survival rate, and then multiplying by 100. For the USA, 15.18% of per 
capita GDP in 2005 was spent on health, ensuring 99.21% an under-five survival rate. This relates to 
0.153% of GDP per capita required to produce 1% of under-five survival, which equates with 15.30% 
of GDP per capita required for achieving a full survival rate. 
10 The proportion of GDP per capita spent on health care is just a proxy for cost of ensuring under five 
survival. There are obviously health costs in all countries not dedicated to child health. All countries 
also have expenditures on child health that are not recorded under ‘health’ (like sanitation 
expenditures). 
  9 
We propose this kind of two-dimensional graphic outcome measure as a compelling 
indicator of governance, relative at least to the field of child health. Readers should 
note that it simply shows whether authority exercised in a given field in a given 
country is producing value of relevance to citizens (cost efficient production of child 
health). It does not stipulate or evaluate how interactions work or which regulatory 
controls facilitate specific kinds of value creation. It allows questions about these 
important aspects of governance as secondary points of reference, however: Why is 
child health so much more expensive in the USA than Singapore? Why is Pakistan in 
a seemingly better position than South Africa and Timor Leste? 
WHAT ABOUT PROCESS?    
The primary focus on outcomes is a major departure from the conventional approach 
to constructing governance indicators, which tends to combine outcome, process and 
policy elements into single measures. There are multiple problems with this 
conventional approach, including the observed fact that many outcomes can be 
effectively produced through alternative processes, with different input mixes and 
different structural and institutional devices regulating how authority is exercised. 
The major reason is that different actors have different authority in different settings 
and governments, therefore, exercise their authority very differently. This leads 
articles like Lynn et al. (2000) to focus on outcomes as the indicator of governance 
and other factors as variables—open to variation and adjustment. 
Health care is provided in different ways across countries and by different actor 
combinations, for example, with the private sector playing more of a role in the USA 
than in Sweden and decentralized governments taking the lead in some OECD 
countries and not in others (Andrews 2008; Mosca 2007). These differences in 
context mean that governments exert authority in different ways (sometimes over 
resources and sometimes via regulation, for example). Ensor and Cooper (2004) note 
that health care is influenced by different actors and factors in different contexts and  
Sepehri et al. (2007) find that the composition and structure of households and society 
influences how and how well health systems work.  
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  10We believe the key issue is whether governments exert authority in ways that produce 
results in context, not whether they exert authority in any specific manner or adopt 
organizational models or approaches that seem appropriate in a benign, best practice 
way. Form should follow function and not the other way around. This is even an issue 
when considering how well endowed countries are in the inputs required to produce 
outcomes. One may be tempted to think that improved access to doctors and nurses is 
an undeniable intermediate product that reflects good governance. Governments 
should use their delegated authority to build cadres of doctors and nurses as a result. 
But South Africa is ranked 3
rd and 4
th in Africa on these measures and can only 
muster 7
th position in terms of infant mortality (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2008). The 
Comoros Islands comes in 6
th on infant mortality even though it ranks 18
th and 20
th 
(out of 48) on the two access measures (Rotberg and Gisselquist 2008).
11  
While access to doctors and nurses are undoubtedly valuable inputs to child health 
outcomes, they may not be the keys to effective service delivery in the Comoros or 
South Africa and other strengths or weaknesses in authority structures may be more 
salient. The relatively weak infant mortality performance of South Africa may, for 
example, be less reflective of government’s failure to use authority in building these 
cadres and more a failure of players within the child health field to effectively 
exercise authority in dealing with other issues—like the presence of HIV/AIDS. The 
relatively strong performance in the Comoros may reflect wise and resourceful use of 
financial, legal and political authority in the child health sector—which may not be 
reflected in improved numbers of doctors and nurses. It may be reflected in improved 
water and sanitation infrastructures (which Fay et al. 2005 note as a vital influence on 
infant mortality rates). Incidentally, the strong performance in these types of countries 
may reflect a governance structure heavily dependent on donors—which is interesting 
to think about from a sustainability perspective. 
We believe that incorporating specific process, participation or regulation elements 
into governance indicators imbues these elements with an un-warranted ‘best 
practice’ legitimacy that might distort discussions on improving governance in 
varying contexts. Measures that suggest there is generic value in having a 
decentralized health system, for example, or a specific budgetary allocation to health 
care, or a certain type of basic health care package or local health clinic structure,
12 
may lead a reform discussion towards these ‘best practice’ solutions instead of a 
discussion of contextual problems prohibiting outcome improvements. This is not a 
concern if the solutions are coupled with the problems, but experience suggests this is 
often not the case (especially manifest in the cross-country variations in the way 
many services are produced). Processes and mechanisms that earn a country 
                                                 
11 Other articles cite additional influences on child survival rates, which also seem to have different 
influences in different contexts—rather than a one-size-fits-all influence everywhere. These include 
state spending (Palma-Solis et al. 2009; Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008), basic infrastructure (Fay et al. 
2005), electricity in urban areas and access to vaccines in rural areas (Wang 2003), controlled inflation 
(Baldacci et al. 2008). Some authors cite multiple influences that are contextually relevant (including 
Cooper (2004), Lawn et al (2007) and Sepehri et al (2008)).    
12 See the Ministry of Health indicators in Malawi in 2003, for examples. 
http://gametlibrary.worldbank.org/FILES/441_Health%20sector%20Indicators%20and%20Indicator%
20Definitions%20-%20Malawi.pdf 
  11legitimacy with external partners (a la isomorphic mimicry) may not improve 
governance at home, simply because they do not improve the way authority is 
exercised in the context to ensure maximized citizen welfare (Andrews 2009). 
We hold that an outcome indicator of governance should effectively facilitate 
discussions about processes, participation and regulation elements as a secondary 
point of reference. As already mentioned, Figure 2 raises some important questions in 
the case of the United States of America, for example, in which comparatively high 
survival rates for children under five are achieved at relatively high costs (15% of per 
capita GDP). Singapore actually produces higher rates of survival for less than a 
quarter of the per capita cost (3.27% of per capita GDP). One may wonder why and 
what the USA can learn from Singapore about effective use of public authority to 
shape its child health field? Or if the per capita spending on health care is higher in 
the United States because the young subsidize the old? These lessons could be about 
context itself: Perhaps it is easier to produce cost efficient health care in a small 
island state? The lessons could also be about which players are involved (including 
the share between public and private, local and national players) as well as what 
specific roles government can play. Timor Leste and Zimbabwe could similarly learn 
lessons about cost containment from Pakistan, as the three countries have similar 
rates of survival but different per capita costs. Secondary questions can help 
researchers examine the mechanics of governance and if different combinations of 
actors, or different institutional tools, facilitate better forms of authority and hence 
outcomes across countries. Once again, the answers may be that these countries are 
materially different in context (size differences are apparent, for example). 
CONTROLLING FOR CONTEXT 
Some contextual factors impact outcomes in a reliable fashion and muddy the study 
of governance. We know, for example, that income levels have a significant impact 
on mortality rate statistics (Pritchett and Summers 1996; Filmer and Pritchett 1999), 
and that even income scores from 25 years ago can explain inter-country differences 
in under-five mortality rates. The fact that Pakistan has a lower survival rate for under 
five year olds than Singapore may thus be more about its level of development than 
its governance quality. Indeed, only 3 of the 64 countries in Figure 2’s bottom right 
‘good governance’ quadrant are low income countries (Vietnam, Uzbekistan and the 
Kyrgyz Republic). 15 out of 24 countries in the top left (inferior governance) 
quadrant are low income, with the highest income country in this quadrant being from 
the upper middle income country group (South Africa). Higher income countries are 
also disadvantaged by development status, given that health care costs per capita are 
much higher in these countries. Higher income countries account for 32 out of the 57 
countries in Figure 2’s top right quadrant (better than average survival rates at higher 
than average costs). This could imply higher costs (and hence lower welfare) in these 
countries, or a health care product that ensures significantly more than survival for 
under-fives (because perhaps more developed citizenries demand more than just 
survival and also because health care cost indicators used show a cross subsidization 
of health costs for the aged).  
  12These kinds of dependable contextual variations are important to consider in both 
assessing governance through outcomes and in identifying where different countries 
should look for lessons on how to improve. Like must be compared with like and 
context must be controlled for in governance indicators. We take a simple approach to 
controlling for context, starting first by observing which variables do have a 
dependable influence on the outcome in question. As discussed, in the case of child 
health, this variable is the nation’s income level (Filmer and Pritchett 1999). Figure 3 
shows just how much variation there has been in mean scores for survival rates over 
the years, across four ‘income leagues’—lower, lower-middle, upper-middle and 
higher (based on United Nations  classifications).  
Lower income countries average under five survival rates in 2005 lower than the 
survival rate average in higher-income countries in 1960. Figure 4 shows that the 
deviation across income leagues is also different, being higher in the lower income 
group. Higher and upper-middle income groups have seen greater convergence 
around commonly high under five survival rates. Given such data, we should not 
expect that a lower income country will score a survival rate as high as a higher 
income country: Even if the lower income country has the best form-based 
governance in the world.  
Fig. 3. Average survival rates across ‘income leagues’, 1960-2005 
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Fig. 4. Standard deviation in survival rates across ‘income leagues’, 1960-2005 
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  13Given these observations, we create a governance outcome measure that controls for 
income leagues present across the world, using the United Nations Classification as a 
guide. The underlying argument is simply that governance in the field of child health 
is best assessed through outcomes when comparing lower income countries with 
other lower income countries, and so forth. So we ask how far each country’s survival 
rate and cost scores are from the averages in their league, measured in standard 
deviations to allow comparison across all countries (applying an approach similar to 
Anderson and Morrissey 2006 and Lawrence 2006). Z-scores are calculated for all of 
the countries, using the score for each country (of the survival rate and cost), and the 
mean and standard deviation (for both measures) for the relevant country set (low 
income, lower middle income, upper middle income and higher income (OECD and 
non-OECD)).  Figure 5 shows the results, with the USA survival rate ending up 0.13 
standard deviations above its high income country group survival rate mean, but 2.64 
standard deviations above the high income country group cost average. South Africa 
stands -2.65 standard deviations below its comparator group (high middle income) in 
regards to survival rates, and is also 1.12 standard deviations above average mean 
costs in this group. 
Fig. 5. Child health outcomes controlling for income group 
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  14overall world average but higher than its comparator lower income group 
average). Pakistan’s performance is below average in comparison to the entire 
world, but above average when compared with countries in its income group. 
Much like a middle-weight boxer may routinely lose against a good heavyweight 
but be the best of the middleweights. 
•  The USA “boxes at its income level” in terms of the survival rate produced (0.13 
standard deviations above the average of higher-income countries) but it “boxes 
below its income level” in terms of cost of production, with costs over 2 standard 
deviations higher than the high-income country average. The USA is an economic 
heavyweight boxing at the middleweight level because of high health care costs. 
Using the language of governance, we conclude that authority in the US child 
health field is not being exercised in a manner that maximizes welfare (given the 
high costs of producing services).  
•  The situation is more dire in South Africa, where weak governance in this sector 
is reflected in weak service delivery (lower than average upper middle income 
group survival rates) and high costs (higher than average upper middle income 
group cost per capita). South Africa may be an economic middleweight, but its 
child health care field struggles to compete as a welterweight.  
The approach to measuring governance in Figure 5 helps one to identify the top 
contenders or better governed countries (in this children’s health field) in all income 
groups:  
•  16 Low income countries fall into the bottom right quadrant: Pakistan, Comoros, 
Mauritania, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Madagascar, Papua New Guinea, Lao PDR, 
Uzbekistan, Kenya, Yemen, Rep., Tajikistan, Nepal, Tanzania, Vietnam, and The 
Gambia. 
•  24 lower middle income countries are in this quadrant: Indonesia, Philippines, 
Thailand, Algeria, Vanuatu, Syrian Arab Republic, Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan, Peru, 
Cape Verde, Mongolia, Samoa, China, Tonga, Ecuador, Morocco, Armenia, 
Tunisia, Colombia, Guatemala, Albania, Dominican Republic, Egypt, and 
Honduras. 
•  15 upper middle income countries are also in the good governance area: Libya, 
Malaysia, Fiji, Mauritius, Venezuela, Romania, Russian Federation, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, Chile, St. Lucia, Lithuania, Latvia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Poland, 
and the Seychelles. 
•  And 10 high income countries box above their weight level: Brunei Darussalam, 
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Bahrain, Estonia, Cyprus, Korea, 
Slovak Republic, and the Czech Republic
. 
A number of factors emerge as intuitive answers to questions about why different 
countries fit into these different ‘governance quadrants’. Many of these are not about 
the processes of governance but rather about the governance context: 
•  It seems, for example, that country size might matter in influencing 
governance outcomes (Singapore has better survival rates at lower cost than 
  15•  Newly-rich countries also seem to do better on this indicator than their other 
high-income comparators, producing high survival rates at much lower 
costs.
13 Do newly rich countries have a leapfrogging benefit, whereby they 
build capacities and relational mechanisms on the basis of the latest 
technology and lessons from older wealthier countries, who are locked into 
their more outdated systems? 
•  Countries with higher Gini coefficients, relative to their income league, seem 
to perform differently, reflecting perhaps the complexities of governing 
unequal countries. The USA has the highest Gini for high income countries, 
and a much higher cost of producing health care; countries like South Africa 
might argue that their inequality puts them in a higher income league than 
appropriate (upper-middle) which results in an unfairly harsh benchmarking.  
•  Higher-income countries seem to do better when there is a greater direct 
public sector expenditure outlay, which may speak to the complexities of 
governing market-driven systems. The high cost of a private sector-led US 
system stands in contrast to other lower cost government led systems in the 
OECD, for example, suggesting different costs drivers and abilities to contain 
cost in these systems. 
These and other second-stage observations provide important avenues for further 
research into why outcomes vary between countries, and will help to focus research 
on real governance and government impacts.   
A one-dimensional measure 
While we think that the two-dimensional approach to showing this indicator is 
appealing from a policy perspective (it shows visually where welfare is being 
produced and lost between the quantity and cost elements of the outcome) we also 
believe that a one-dimensional governance indicator might be calculated through the 
proposed approach. This would essentially involve combining the two elements to see 
how far an individual country departs from its income group on both survival rate and 
cost measures. The combined deviation-from-mean scores are shown in Figure 6, 
where the z-score for cost in each country has been subtracted from the z-score for 
survival rate; for the USA this results in 0.13-2.64=-2.51.  The USA fits into the area 
to the left of the vertical line, which reflects increasingly weaker outcomes, welfare 
for citizens and hence governance.  
Fig.6. A single indicator of governance quality in the child health field 
                                                 
13 High income countries in the lower right good governance quadrant all seem to fall into this 
grouping: Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Korea, Kuwait, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic and the United Arab Emirates. 
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The vertical axis in Figure 6 is the same as that used in Figure 1, to show how this 
new indicator is not biased to a country’s income group (as most governance 
indicators are). Actually, the focus on income-group controlled survival rates and 
costs leads one to identify three lower income countries as having the (relatively) best 
governance in the 181 country sample (Comoros, Pakistan and Bangladesh). The 
worst ten performers come from an assortment of income groups, including higher 
income (Equatorial Guinea and the USA), upper middle (South Africa and Gabon), 
lower middle (Kiribati, Timor Leste, and Djibouti) and lower income (Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda and Burkina Faso).  
Readers might ask the obvious questions: Is governance in the child health sector 
really better in Pakistan and the Comoros than it is in the United States? The answer 
is yes, given the different contexts of these countries. While Pakistan and the 
Comoros have lower under five survival rates than the USA, these survival rates are 
high relative to the income group they are a part of, and the cost of generating these 
survival rates is relatively low, given their comparators. The USA has average 
survival rates, relative to its high income reference group, produced at very high costs 
relative to its peers. These high costs cause the United States to score substantially 
below the high income league averages on the combined u5mr/cost measure—as 
shown in Figure 6.  
The United States is the only high income country to score more than two standard 
deviations below its peers on this indicator. It could learn from a host of other high 
income countries how to better govern its child health arena (especially countries like 
Japan and Korea, both of whom are more than one standard deviation above the peer 
mean). These countries appear to have better governed child health fields, where 
comparatively strong under-five survival rates are achieved at relatively low costs. It 
is not to say that the governance structures here have cultural, political or other 
transferability, but just that they appear good practice within the United State’s 
income league. 
  17CONCLUSION 
We contend that this indicator is useful in helping countries benchmark themselves, 
identifying contextually better from worse governed countries, and guiding the latter 
group of countries in identifying options for reform. This, we believe, is what a good 
indicator should do: pointing to better and worse performers and allowing more 
informed investigation about why these are better and worse performers.  
The usefulness of this indicator emerges primarily because the measure itself is 
focused on just one outcome, in one field (or sector). To return to our earlier 
metaphor, it reflects governance as a specific rather than a general health issue. This 
kind of focus is one reason why we see discrepancies between our measure and others 
(which a comparison of Figures 6 and 1 will show). Among these discrepancies:  
•  The Comoros, Bangladesh, Eritrea and Libya are all in our top ten countries but 
all fall below the 15
th percentile for the WGI Government Effectiveness indicator.  
•  Only one of our top ten performers (Brunei) fits into the WGI top quartile.  
•  Two of our worst performers (South Africa and the USA) are in the WGI 
Government Effectiveness top quartile (with the USA sitting at the 91
st percentile 
in 2007).  
•  Countries as varied as Botswana, Namibia, Switzerland, France and Germany also 
come off looking worse in our measure than in the WGI equivalent. 
We hope that this kind of indicator can help counter those who critique critics of the 
prominent governance indicators (like WGI) by asking: “Can you measure 
governance better?” We think we can, and in this article we try to set out an approach 
to doing so, focused on the child health sector. The basic argument behind this 
indicator and approach is simply that governance indicators should be theoretically 
sound, focused on outcomes, adjusted for context, and limited to one field at a time. 
Under-five survival rates are used to show what this kind of indicator could look like, 
but one could imagine different indicators for different fields (like education, specific 
industries, safety and security, etc.) (Andrews 2008).  In all cases the indicator should 
reflect the result of delegated authority (by citizens to government) on welfare 
creation in the specific field. The indicator then allows second-stage discussions 
about why welfare creation looks like it does, how this might reflect governance, and 
what might be done to improve governance in the future.  
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